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Abstract
This paper studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility as a generalization
of bankruptcy problems with monetary estate and claims. Following the theory on TU-
bankruptcy, we introduce a duality notion for NTU-bankruptcy rules and derive several
axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule and the constrained relative equal awards
rule.
Keywords NTU-bankruptcy · Duality · Proportional rule · Constrained relative equal
awards rule
JEL Classification C79 · D63 · D74
1 Introduction
In a bankruptcy problemwith transferable utility (cf.O’Neill 1982), claimants have individual
claims on an perfectly divisible but insufficient estate. Bankruptcy theory analyzes allocations
of the estate among the claimants, taking into account their claims. Bankruptcy problems
with transferable utility are well-studied both from an axiomatic as well as a game theoretic
perspective (cf. Thomson 2003, 2013, 2015).
Carpente et al. (2013) analyzed bankruptcy problems where claimants may have different
and nonlinear utility functions. In particular, they put forward the channel assignment prob-
lem in wireless telecommunication networks. Other situations that fit into this framework
are a company’s pension fund which cannot meet its liabilities and employees experience
their losses differently due to wealth distinctions, a university allocating its restricted bud-
get and departments experience their deficits differently due to equipment distinctions, or a
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supranational organization which limits polluting emissions and countries experience their
reductions differently due to industry distinctions. This information is relevant for fair allo-
cations and it can be taken into account by modeling these situations as bankruptcy problems
with nontransferable utility. Alternatively, bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
can be interpreted as bargaining problems with claims (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992) or Nash
rationing problems (cf. Mariotti and Villar 2005).
This paper studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility as a generalization
of bankruptcy problems with monetary estate and claims. The estate is the set of attainable
utility allocations which are assumed to be normalized such that allocating nothing to a
claimant corresponds to zero utility. The claims represent the individual utility claims of the
claimants on the estate. Orshan et al. (2003), Carpente et al. (2013), Dietzenbacher (2018) and
Estévez-Fernández et al. (2020) analyzed NTU-bankruptcy problems from a game theoretic
perspective by defining an associated bankruptcy game and focusing on the structure of
the core. We axiomatically approach NTU-bankruptcy problems and especially show that
bankruptcy theory can be extended by adequately reformulating rules and properties, with a
focus on the proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and duality.
The proportional rule for bankruptcy problems prescribes the efficient allocation which is
proportional to the vector of claims. The constrained equal awards rule for TU-bankruptcy
problems divides the estate as equally as possible under the condition that claimants are
not allocated more than their claims. Interpreting the utopia values, the maximal individ-
ual payoffs within the estate, as aspirational references inducing an egalitarian direction,
we define the constrained relative equal awards rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems which
allocates payoffs as relatively equally as possible, i.e. proportional to the utopia values. This
generalizes the constrained equal awards rule for TU-bankruptcy problems while ensuring
covariance under individual rescaling of utility.
Within TU-bankruptcy theory, duality of rules and many defined properties are based on
modifications of the estate. Such a modification can be interpreted as a homothetic transfor-
mation which preserves the shape of the estate. In line with this interpretation, we apply a
uniform scaling operation to modify the estate of NTU-bankruptcy problems. It is impor-
tant to note that uniform scaling is not in conflict with individual scaling, i.e. all considered
notions are covariant under individual rescaling of utility. On the one hand, we define duality
of NTU-bankruptcy rules and show that the proportional rule is self-dual and that the con-
strained relative equal awards rule is dual to the constrained relative equal losses rule. On the
other hand, we define several properties concerning shape-preserving changes in the estate
and derive corresponding axiomatic characterizations. In particular, we generalize the charac-
terizations of the proportional rule based on estate linearity (cf. Chun 1988), and composition
down/up and self-duality (cf. Young 1988). Moreover, we generalize the characterizations
of the constrained relative equal awards rule based on symmetry, truncation invariance, and
composition up (cf. Dagan 1996), claim monotonicity and conditional full compensation (cf.
Yeh 2006), and conditional full compensation and composition down (cf. Herrero and Villar
2002; Yeh 2004). Interestingly, we show that the constrained relative equal awards rule also
shares a characteristic feature with the serial cost sharing rule (cf. Moulin and Shenker 1992)
by generalizing a characterization based on symmetry and independence of larger claims.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 formally introduces NTU-
bankruptcy problems and NTU-bankruptcy rules. In Sects. 3 and 4, we introduce a duality
notion and axiomatically study NTU-bankruptcy rules, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
Let N be a nonempty and finite set of claimants. For any x, y ∈ RN+ , x ≤ y denotes xi ≤ yi
for all i ∈ N , and x < y denotes xi < yi for all i ∈ N . The zero-vector x ∈ RN+ with xi = 0
for all i ∈ N is denoted by 0N .
A bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility (NTU-bankruptcy problem, cf. Orshan
et al. 2003) is a triple (N , E, c), where E ⊆ RN+ is the estate which is assumed to be
• Nonempty, closed, and bounded;
• Comprehensive, i.e. E = {x ∈ RN+ | ∃y∈E : y ≥ x};
• Nonleveled, i.e. P(E) = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E,y =x : y ≥ x} = {x ∈ E | ¬∃y∈E : y > x};1
and c ∈ RN+ with c ≮ x for all x ∈ E is the vector of claims of N on E . The estate
is the set of attainable utility allocations which are assumed to be normalized such that
allocating nothing to a claimant corresponds to zero utility. The claim vector represents the
individual utility claims on the estate. Since our analysis is based on a fixed population, an
NTU-bankruptcy problem is denoted by (E, c). Note that any TU-bankruptcy problem (cf.
O’Neill 1982) with monetary estate M ∈ R+ induces an NTU-bankruptcy problem with
E = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ M}. Let BRN denote the class of all NTU-bankruptcy problems
with claimants N , estate E = {0N }, and claims c /∈ E .
Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . For any t ∈ R++, the set t E ⊆ RN+ is defined by t E = {t x | x ∈ E}.
The vector of utopia values uE ∈ RN++ is defined by
uE = (max{xi | x ∈ E})i∈N .
Note that utE = tuE for all t ∈ R++. Let x ∈ RN+ \ {0N }. The scalar λE,x ∈ R++ is defined
in such a way that
x ∈ P(λE,x E) and 1
λE,x
x ∈ P(E).
Note that the conditions on E imply that λE,x uniquely exists. Moreover, λE,x ≤ 1 if x ∈ E ,
and λE,x > 1 if x /∈ E . For any t ∈ R++,
λt E,x = λ
E,x
t
and λE,t x = tλE,x .
Note that (t E, x) ∈ BRN for all t ∈ (0, λE,x ), and (E, t x) ∈ BRN for all t ∈ ( 1
λE,x
,∞).
A bankruptcy rule f assigns to any bankruptcy problem (E, c) a payoff allocation
f (E, c) ∈ P(E) for which f (E, c) ≤ c. These conditions are known as efficiency and
claims boundedness, respectively. Note that f (E, c) = 0N if E = {0N }, and f (E, c) = c if
c ∈ E .
The proportional rule, Prop, assigns to any bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN the payoff
allocation which is proportional to the vector of claims, i.e.
Prop(E, c) = 1
λE,c
c.
1 In other words, the strong Pareto set coincides with the weak Pareto set. This condition is also called strict
comprehensiveness (see e.g. Roemer 1998).
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The constrained relative equal awards rule, CREA, assigns to any bankruptcy problem




min{ci , αE,cuEi }
)
i∈N ,
where αE,c ∈ (0, 1) is such that CREA(E, c) ∈ P(E).
The constrained relative equal losses rule, CREL, assigns to any bankruptcy problem




max{0, ci − βE,cuEi }
)
i∈N ,
where βE,c ∈ R++ is such that CREL(E, c) ∈ P(E).
For any (E, c) ∈ BRN with E = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ M} induced by a TU-bankruptcy
problemwithmonetary estateM ∈ R++, we have uEi = M for all i ∈ N and the proportional
rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses
rule coincide with the classic proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the
constrained equal losses rule, respectively.
3 Duality
In this section, we introduce a duality notion for bankruptcy rules. Two TU-bankruptcy rules
are dual (cf. Aumann and Maschler 1985) if one rule allocates awards in the same way as
the other rule allocates losses. How a rule allocates losses is determined by applying the rule
to the ‘dual problem’ in which the estate equals the total monetary deficit in the original
problem. Alternatively, the estate of the dual problem can be obtained by scaling the original
estate from the claims vector in the direction of the origin in such a way that the boundary
intersects the assigned payoff allocation. The latter interpretation can also be applied in the
NTU-bankruptcy context. TwoNTU-bankruptcy rules are dual when one rule allocates utility
awards in the same way as the other rule allocates utility losses in the dual problem obtained
by this scaling method.
Dual Bankruptcy Rules
Two bankruptcy rules f and g are dual if for all (E, c) ∈ BRN ,2
f (E, c) = c − g
(
λE,c− f (E,c)E, c
)





The following lemma shows that a bankruptcy rule has at most one dual.
Lemma 1 Let f , g, and h be bankruptcy rules. If f and g are dual, and f and h are dual,
then g = h.
Proof Assume that f and g are dual, and that f and h are dual. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then













= h(λE,g(E,c)E, c) = h(E, c),
2 Note that (λE,c− f (E,c)E, c) ∈ BRN since λE,c− f (E,c) ∈ (0, λE,c).
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where the first and third equality follow from duality of f and g, the second equality follows
from duality of f and h, and the last equality follows from g(E, c) ∈ P(E), which implies
λE,g(E,c) = 1. Hence, g = h.
A bankruptcy rule is self-dual if it coincides with its dual.
Self-Dual Bankruptcy Rule
A bankruptcy rule f is self-dual if f (E, c) = c− f (λE,c− f (E,c)E, c) for all (E, c) ∈ BRN .
In contrast to TU-bankruptcy, an NTU-bankruptcy rule does not necessarily have a dual,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN given by
E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + x2 ≤ 9} and c = (4, 10). Then, λE,c = 2 and (1, 8), (2, 5) ∈ P(E).
Let t ∈ (0, λE,c) be given by t = 19 (1 +
√
82) and let f be a bankruptcy rule such that
f (E, c) = (2, 5) and f (t E, c) = (3, 2).
E
c







Suppose that g is a dual bankruptcy rule. Then
(2, 5) = f (E, c) = c − g(λE,c− f (E,c)E, c) = c − g(λE,(2,5)E, c) = c − g(E, c)
and (3, 2) = f (t E, c) = c − g(λE,c− f (t E,c)E, c) = c − g(λE,(1,8)E, c) = c − g(E, c).
This means that g is not a well-defined rule. Hence, f does not have a dual.
However, it is readily seen that all rules satisfying path monotonicity, as defined in Sect. 4,
have a dual. In particular, this is the case for the proportional rule, the constrained relative
equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule. In fact, the proportional rule
is self-dual and the constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained relative equal
losses rule are dual.
Theorem 1 (i) The proportional rule is self-dual.
(ii) The constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained relative equal losses
rule are dual.
Proof (i) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then





















c = c − 1
λE,c
c = c − Prop(E, c).
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Hence, the proportional rule is self-dual.
(ii) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . First, we show that CREA(E, c) = c−CREL(λE,c−CREA(E,c)E, c).
Denote d = λE,c−CREA(E,c). Suppose that dβdE,c ≤ αE,c. For all i ∈ N ,
CRELi (dE, c) = max
{
0, ci − βdE,cudEi
} = ci − min{ci , dβdE,cuEi }
≥ ci − min{ci , αE,cuEi } = ci − CREAi (E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, CREL(dE, c) ∈ P(dE), and c − CREA(E, c) ∈ P(dE),
this means that CREL(dE, c) = c − CREA(E, c). Clearly, similar arguments
apply to the case dβdE,c > αE,c. Second, we show that CREL(E, c) = c −
CREA(λE,c−CREL(E,c)E, c). Denote d ′ = λE,c−CREL(E,c). Suppose that d ′αd ′E,c ≤
βE,c. For all i ∈ N ,
CREAi (d
′E, c) = min {ci , αd ′E,cud ′Ei
} = ci − max{0, ci − d ′αd ′E,cuEi }
≤ ci − max{0, ci − βE,cuEi } = ci − CRELi (E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, CREA(d ′E, c) ∈ P(d ′E), and c − CREL(E, c) ∈ P(d ′E), this
means that CREA(d ′E, c) = c − CREL(E, c). Clearly, similar arguments apply to the
case d ′αd ′E,c > βE,c. Hence, CREA and CREL are dual.
Theorem 1 is illustrated by the following example. Note that the dual problem is not
uniquely defined, but depends on the bankruptcy rule under consideration.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2} and consider the bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ BRN given by
E = {x ∈ RN+ | x21 + 12x2 ≤ 36} and c = (3, 4). Then λE,c = 32 and Prop(E, c) = 23c =
(2, 223 ). This means that λ
E,c−Prop(E,c) = 12 . Since the proportional rule is self-dual,













Moreover, uE = (6, 3) and αE,c = 34 . This means that CREA(E, c) = (3, 2 14 ) and
λE,c−CREA(E,c) = 712 . Since the constrained relative equal awards rule and the constrained
relative equal losses rule are dual,
CREA(E, c) = c − CREL( 712 E, c).
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In this section, we axiomatically study NTU-bankruptcy rules. First, we focus on properties
concerning changes in the estate. Instead of considering arbitrary changes in the estate,
we restrict to homothetic transformations. This allows us to analyze the implications when
the shape of the estate is preserved. The payoff path of a bankruptcy rule represents all
prescribed payoff allocations when the estate is uniformly scaled. A bankruptcy rule satisfies
path linearity when this payoff path is linear. Path composition down says that solutions on
the payoff path can replace the claim vector when the estate is scaled down. Path composition
up says that solutions on the payoff path can act as a new origin fromwhich the estate is scaled
up again. Path monotonicity and path continuity require that the payoff path is nondecreasing
and continuous, respectively.
A bankruptcy rule f satisfies
• Path linearity if f (t E, c) = t f (E, c) for all t ∈ (0, 1);
• Path composition down if f (t E, c) = f (t E, f (E, c)) for all t ∈ (0, 1);
• Path composition up if f (E, c) = f (t E, c) + f (λE, f (E,c)− f (t E,c)E, c − f (t E, c)) for
all t ∈ (0, 1);
• Path monotonicity if f (t E, c) ≤ f (E, c) for all t ∈ (0, 1);
• Path continuity if f (t E, c) is continuous in t ∈ (0, 1).
As in TU-bankruptcy, path linearity implies both path composition down and path com-
position up, path composition down and path composition up both imply path monotonicity,
and path monotonicity implies path continuity. This is summarized in the following diagram.
path linearity
path composition down path composition up
path monotonicity
path continuity
Two properties for bankruptcy rules are dual (cf. Herrero and Villar 2001) if for any two
dual bankruptcy rules, one property is satisfied by one rule if and only if the other property
123
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is satisfied by the other rule. A property for bankruptcy rules is self-dual if for any two dual
bankruptcy rules, the property is satisfied by one rule if and only if it is satisfied by the
other rule. As in TU-bankruptcy, path linearity is self-dual, path composition down and path
composition up are dual, path monotonicity is self-dual, and path continuity is self-dual. This
is captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (i) Path linearity is self-dual.
(ii) Path composition down and path composition up are dual.
(iii) Path monotonicity is self-dual.
(iv) Path continuity is self-dual.
The proportional rule satisfies path linearity. The constrained relative equal awards rule
and the constrained relative equal losses rule do not satisfy path linearity, but they do satisfy
path composition down and path composition up. This is summarized in the following table.
Prop CREA CREL
Path linearity + − −
Path composition down + + +
Path composition up + + +
Path monotonicity + + +
Path continuity + + +
Inspired by Chun (1988) and Young (1988), we generalize the axiomatic characterizations
of the proportional rule in terms of path linearity; path composition down and self-duality;
and path composition up and self-duality to the domain of NTU-bankruptcy problems. The
proof is postponed to the “Appendix”.
Theorem 2 The proportional rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying
(i) Path linearity;
(ii) Path composition down and self-duality;
(iii) Path composition up and self-duality.
Next, we focus on properties related to the constrained relative equal awards rule. A
bankruptcy rule satisfies relative symmetry if claimants with relatively equal claims get rel-
atively equal payoffs. This generalizes the equal treatment of claimants with equal claims
property for TU-bankruptcy rules while ensuring covariance under individual rescaling of
utility. Claimmonotonicity states that a claimant cannot beworse offwhen its claim increases.
Truncation invariance requires that the allocated payoffs only depend on the truncated claims,
i.e. the claims truncated by the utopia values. Conditional full compensation imposes that
claimants with small enough relative claims are fully reimbursed. A relative claim is consid-
ered small enough if all claimants could be fully reimbursed when their relative claims are
truncated by this specific relative claim. Independence of larger relative claims implies that
a claimant’s payoff does not depend on the larger relative claims.
A bankruptcy rule f satisfies
• Relative symmetry if fi (E,c)
uEi
= f j (E,c)
uEj





• Claim monotonicity if fi (E, c) ≤ fi (E, (c′i , cN\{i})) for all i ∈ N with c′i > ci ;
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• Truncation invariance if f (E, c) = f (E, ĉE ), where
ĉE =
(
min{ci , uEi }
)
i∈N ;














• Independence of larger relative claims if fi (E, c) = fi (E, (c′j , cN\{ j})) for all i, j ∈ N










The constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies these five properties. The propor-
tional rule and the constrained relative equal losses rule satisfy relative symmetry and claim
monotonicity, but do not satisfy truncation invariance, conditional full compensation, and
independence of larger relative claims. This is summarized in the following table.
Prop CREA CREL
Relative symmetry + + +
Claim monotonicity + + +
Truncation invariance − + −
Conditional full compensation − + −
Independence of larger relative claims − + −
Inspired by Dagan (1996), Yeh (2006), Herrero and Villar (2002), Yeh (2004) and Moulin
and Shenker (1992), we generalize the axiomatic characterizations of the constrained relative
equal awards rule in terms of relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and path composition
up; claimmonotonicity and conditional full compensation; conditional full compensation and
path composition down; and relative symmetry and independence of larger relative claims to
the domain of NTU-bankruptcy problems. The proof is postponed to the “Appendix”.
Theorem 3 The constrained relative equal awards rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satis-
fying
(i) Relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and path composition up;
(ii) Claim monotonicity and conditional full compensation;
(iii) Conditional full compensation and path composition down;
(iv) Relative symmetry and independence of larger relative claims.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper introduces a duality notion for NTU-bankruptcy rules and derives several
axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule and the constrained relative equal awards
rule. In follow-up research, axiomatic characterizations of the constrained relative equal
losses rule can be obtained by applying a careful duality analysis. This is however not
straightforward, since not all duality relations are inherited from the TU-bankruptcy model.
In particular, Dietzenbacher et al. (2020) showed that the constrained relative equal losses rule
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does not satisfy minimal rights first, implying that minimal rights first and truncation invari-
ance are not dual properties in the NTU-bankruptcy model. Similar challenges arise when
defining a suitable generalization of the self-dual Talmud rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler
1985). Although our approach is successful in generalizing fundamental duality relations
from the TU-bankruptcy model, we do not claim that our definition is the only interpre-
tation of duality in the NTU-bankruptcy model. Possibly, alternative interpretations could
serve alternative purposes. Moreover, NTU-bankruptcy problems could be further general-
ized to NTU-bankruptcy problems with a priori unions, in line with Borm et al. (2005), or to
NTU-bankruptcy problems with references, in line with Pulido et al. (2002) and Pulido et al.
(2008).
Acknowledgements Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher
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helpful comments and suggestions.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2 (i) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let t ∈ (0, 1). Then
Prop(t E, c) = 1
λt E,c
c = t 1
λE,c
c = tProp(E, c).
Hence, the proportional rule satisfies path linearity. Let f be a bankruptcy rule satisfying
path linearity. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Then








f (λE,cE, c) = 1
λE,c
c = Prop(E, c).
Hence, f = Prop.
(ii) By Theorem 1(i), the proportional rule satisfies self-duality. By Theorem 2(i), the
proportional rule satisfies path composition down. Let f be a bankruptcy rule satisfy-
ing path composition down and self-duality. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . By path continuity,
there is a t ∈ (0, λE,c) such that ∑i∈N fi (t E, c) = 12
∑
i∈N ci . By self-duality,


















By path monotonicity, t = λE,c− f (t E,c) and f (t E, c) = f (λE,c− f (t E,c)E, c). This
means that t = 12λE,c and f (t E, c) = 12c. Similarly, f ( 12λE,
1































































Continuing this reasoning, f ( m2n λ
E,cE, c) = m2n c for all m, n ∈ N with m ≤ 2n . By
path continuity, f (tλE,cE, c) = tc for all t ∈ (0, 1). Hence, f (E, c) = Prop(E, c).
(iii) By Theorem 1(i), the proportional rule satisfies self-duality. By Theorem 2(i), the pro-
portional rule satisfies path composition up. Let f be a bankruptcy rule satisfying path
composition up and self-duality. By Lemma 2(ii), f satisfies path composition down
and self-duality. By Theorem 2(ii), f = Prop.






















= min{c j , α
E,cuEj }
uEj
= CREA j (E, c)
uEj
.
Hence, the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies relative symmetry. Let
(E, c) ∈ BRN . For all i ∈ N ,
CREAi (E, ĉ
E ) = min{ĉEi , αE,ĉ
E
uEi } = min{min{ci , uEi }, αE,ĉ
E
uEi }
= min{ci , uEi , αE,ĉ
E
uEi } = min{ci , αE,ĉ
E
uEi }.
Since E is nonleveled, this means that CREA(E, c) = CREA(E, ĉE ). Hence, the
constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies truncation invariance. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN
and let t ∈ (0, 1). For all i ∈ N , CREAi (t E, c) = min{ci , tαt E,cuEi }. This means that
CREA(t E, c) ≤ CREA(E, c). Denote d = λE,CREA(E,c)−CREA(t E,c). Suppose that
dαdE,c−CREA(t E,c) ≤ αE,c − tαt E,c. For all i ∈ N with CREAi (t E, c) = ci ,
CREAi (dE, c − CREA(t E, c)) = 0 = ci − ci = CREAi (E, c) − CREAi (t E, c).
For all i ∈ N with CREAi (t E, c) = tαt E,cuEi ,
CREAi (dE, c − CREA(t E, c)) = min
{








ci − tαt E,cuEi , αE,cuEi − tαt E,cuEi
}
= min {ci , αE,cuEi } − tαt E,cuEi
= CREAi (E, c) − CREAi (t E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, CREA(dE, c − CREA(t E, c)) ∈ P(dE), and CREA(E, c) −
CREA(t E, c) ∈ P(dE), this means that
CREA(dE, c − CREA(t E, c)) = CREA(E, c) − CREA(t E, c).
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Clearly, similar arguments apply to the case dαdE,c−CREA(t E,c) > αE,c − tαt E,c.
Hence, the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies path composition up. Let
f be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry, truncation invariance, and path
composition up. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Suppose that f (t E, c) = CREA(t E, c) for some
t ∈ [0, λE,c]. Define t̂ = inf{t ∈ [0, λE,c] | f (t E, c) = CREA(t E, c)}. By path
continuity, t̂ ∈ [0, λE,c) and f (t̂ E, c) = CREA(t̂ E, c). Denote N = {1, . . . , |N |}
such that c1
uE1
≤ · · · ≤ c|N |
uE|N |
. Let k ∈ N be such that fi (t̂ E, c) = ci for all i < k,
and fi (t̂ E, c) = t̂α t̂ E,cuEi < ci for all i ≥ k. Define m = min{‖x‖ | x ∈ P(E)}.
Let ε ∈ (0,m( ck
uEk
− fk (t̂ E,c)
uEk
)). By path continuity, there is a δ > 0 such that
‖ f (t E, c)− f (t̂ E, c)‖ < ε for all t ∈ (t̂,min{t̂+δ, λE,c}). Let t ∈ (t̂,min{t̂+δ, λE,c}).
By path monotonicity, λE, f (t E,c)− f (t̂ E,c) ∈ (0, λE,c). Denote d = λE, f (t E,c)− f (t̂ E,c).





− fk(t̂ E, c)
uEk
)
> ε > ‖ f (t E, c) − f (t̂ E, c)‖ = ‖ f (dE, c − f (t̂ E, c))‖ ≥ dm.
This means that d < ( ck
uEk
− fk (t̂ E,c)
uEk
). Define ũdE ∈ RN+ by
ũdEi =
{
0 for all i < k;
udEi for all i ≥ k.
For all i < k,
ũdEi = 0 = ci − ci = ci − fi (t̂ E, c) = ci − CREAi (t̂ E, c).
For all i ≥ k,
















= ci − t̂α t̂ E,cuEi = ci − fi (t̂ E, c) = ci − CREAi (t̂ E, c).
By truncation invariance and relative symmetry,
f
(




= CREA(dE, ũdE) = CREA(dE, c − CREA(t̂ E, c)).
By composition up,
f (t E, c) = f (t̂ E, c) + f (dE, c − f (t̂ E, c))
= CREA(t̂ E, c) + CREA(dE, c − CREA(t̂ E, c))
= CREA(t E, c).
This contradicts the definition of t̂ . Hence, f (t E, c) = CREA(t E, c) for all t ∈
[0, λE,c].
(ii) Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let i ∈ N with c′i > ci . If αE,(c
′
i ,cN\{i}) ≥ αE,c, then
CREAi (E, (c
′
i , cN\{i})) = min{c′i , αE,(c
′
i ,cN\{i})uEi } ≥ min{ci , αE,cuEi } = CREAi (E, c).
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Suppose that αE,(c
′
i ,cN\{i}) < αE,c. For all j ∈ N \ {i},
CREA j (E, (c
′
i , cN\{i})) = min{c j , αE,(c
′
i ,cN\{i})uEj } ≤ min{c j , αE,cuEj }
= CREA j (E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, this means that CREAi (E, c′) ≥ CREAi (E, c). Hence, the
constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies claim monotonicity. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN














Suppose that CREAi (E, c) = αE,cuEi . For all j ∈ N ,















Since E is nonleveled, this means that CREAi (E, c) = ci . Hence, the constrained
relative equal awards rule satisfies conditional full compensation. Let f be a bankruptcy
rule satisfying claim monotonicity and conditional full compensation. Let (E, c) ∈















uEj = min{c j , αE,cuEj } = CREA j (E, c).














By conditional full compensation, fi (E, c) = ci . Suppose that f (E, c) = CREA(E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, there is a k ∈ N with fk(E, c) < CREAk(E, c) = αE,cuEk < ck .






























By conditional full compensation, fk(E, (c′k, cN\{k})) = c′k . Then fk(E, (c′k, cN\{k})) >
fk(E, c), contradicting claim monotonicity. Hence, f (E, c) = CREA(E, c).
(iii) By Theorem 3(ii), the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies conditional full
compensation. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN and let t ∈ (0, 1). For all i ∈ N , CREAi (t E, c) =
min{ci , tαt E,cuEi }. This means that CREA(t E, c) ≤ CREA(E, c). Suppose that
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αt E,CREA(E,c) ≤ αt E,c. For all i ∈ N ,
CREAi (t E,CREA(E, c)) = min{CREAi (E, c), αt E,CREA(E,c)utEi }
≤ min{min{ci , αE,cuEi }, αt E,cut Ei }
= min{min{ci , αE,cuEi },min{ci , αt E,cut Ei }}
= min{CREAi (E, c),CREAi (t E, c)}
= CREAi (t E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, CREA(t E,CREA(E, c)) ∈ P(t E), and CREA(t E, c) ∈ P(t E),
this means that CREA(t E,CREA(E, c)) = CREA(t E, c). Clearly, similar arguments
apply to the case αt E,CREA(E,c) > αt E,c. Hence, the constrained relative equal awards
rule satisfies path composition down. Let f be a bankruptcy rule satisfying conditional
full compensation and path composition down. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Let i ∈ N with















uEj = min{c j , αE,cuEj } = CREA j (E, c).














By conditional full compensation, fi (E, c) = ci . Suppose that f (E, c) = CREA(E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, there is a k ∈ N with fk(E, c) < CREAk(E, c) = αE,cuEk < ck .
By path monotonicity and path continuity, there is a t ∈ (1, λE,c) such that fk(t E, c) =















uEj = CREA j (E, c).














By conditional full compensation, fk(E, f (t E, c)) = fk(t E, c). By path composition
down, fk(E, c) = fk(t E, c). This is a contradiction. Hence, f (E, c) = CREA(E, c).
(iv) By Theorem 3(i), the constrained relative equal awards rule satisfies relative symmetry.











E,(c′j ,cN\{ j}) ≥ αE,c. For all k ∈ N ,
CREAk(E, (c
′
j , cN\{ j})) ≥ min{ck, αE,cuEk } = CREAk(E, c).
Since E is nonleveled, this means that CREA(E, (c′j , cN\{ j})) = CREA(E, c). Now
suppose that αE,(c
′
j ,cN\{ j}) < αE,c. For all k ∈ N \ { j},
CREAk(E, (c
′
j , cN\{ j})) ≤ min{ck, αE,cuEk } = CREAk(E, c).
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Suppose that CREAi (E, (c′j , cN\{ j})) < CREAi (E, c). Then α
E,(c′j ,cN\{ j}) < ci
uEi
. Since
E is nonleveled, CREA j (E, (c′j , cN\{ j})) > CREA j (E, c). Then α




This is a contradiction. Hence, CREAi (E, (c′j , cN\{ j})) = CREAi (E, c) and the con-
strained relative equal awards rule satisfies independence of larger relative claims. Let
f be a bankruptcy rule satisfying relative symmetry and independence of larger relative
claims. Let (E, c) ∈ BRN . Denote N = {1, . . . , |N |} such that c1
uE1
≤ · · · ≤ c|N |
uE|N |
. Let
k ∈ N be such that CREAi (E, c) = ci for all i < k, and CREAi (E, c) = αE,cuEi < ci
for all i ≥ k. For all i < k, by independence of larger relative claims,
fi (E, c) = fi (E,CREA(E, c)) = CREAi (E, c).
For all i ≥ k, define ci ∈ RN+ by
cij =
{
c j for all j ≤ i;
ci
uEi
uEj for all j > i .
By independence of larger relative claims and relative symmetry,
fk(E, c) = fk(E, ck) = αE,ck uEk = CREAk(E, ck) = CREAk(E, c).
Next, these arguments apply to claimant k + 1. Continuing this reasoning, fi (E, c) =
CREAi (E, c) for all i ≥ k. Hence, f (E, c) = CREA(E, c).
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